Analysis of Tort Cases by Green, Leon
ANALYSIS OF TORT CASEiS'
LEON GREEN*
The discussion of any problem of law must begin with the
assumption that it can be adequately handled by some ac-
cepted legal theory, or that it can be made to submit to some
such theory yet to be designed. An adequate working
hypothesis is as necessary to a legal science as to any other
science. Needless to say there has been no comprehensive
system of legal theory designed to take care of all the prob-
lems which arise under government. Any system which there
may be is made up of numerous fragmentary parts, each
fashioned to handle a particular group of problems, and
even these larger parts are made up of still smaller frag-
ments. For instance, there are groups of contract problems,
agency problems, corporation problems, tort problems, but
each one of these groups is controlled by a conglomerate of
theories rather than by a single theory. Difficulties and mis-
understandings arise largely out of the clashings and con-
tradictions of a multitude of helter-skelter theories im-
provised for the day and perpetuated to plague legal science
indefinitely.
The value of legal theory is found primarily in three re-
quisites. (1) There can be no such thing as acceptable
lump-sum judgments on complex transactions. Complicated
data can only be handled reliably by breaking them into
parts and examining them bit by bit. An analytical device
is the first demand made on legal theory. (2) The process
of government for passing judgment on the problems in-
volved in most situations is complex. The judicial process
may consist of trial judge, jury, and appellate court, to say
nothing of preliminary steps taken by attorneys, commis-
sioners, and other agencies. In order to make possible a
division of labor there must be adequate machinery for al-
* Professor of Law, Yale University.
1 This brief discussion of legal theory in tort eases introduced a series
of lectures dealing with tort problems given by the writer at the College of
Law of West Virginia University on Feb. 25-26.
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locating the functions and distributing the burdens of the
process. This is the second demand on legal theory. (3) In
order that the persons who are concerned in the processes
of government may articulate what they are doing so that
they may make themselves understood and understand others
likewise engaged, and that there may be a synthesizing of
the entire results of these processes, the most flexible,
adaptable and comprehensive facilities for communication
should be available. This is the third demand on legal
theory. All these requisites are so inter-dependent that
they require highly co-ordinated intellectual machinery.
In the field of torts are found a series of problems thrown
together under such catch-phrases as trespass, deceit, de-
famation, malicious prosecution, negligence and others. Each
of these -series of problems has its own set-up of legal theory.
A transaction or case generally awaits a classfication into
one of these series before it is subjected to analysis and solu-
tion. Attempts are made to keep these classifications sharp-
ly defined and set off one from the other. But about the
first observation made by any one who has attempted to
teach the subject of torts is that these groups cannot be
kept separate. They tend to run all over the field. Judges
in their opinions intermingle the terms appropriate to the
various theories. in most disconterting fashions and long
before students give over the study of the first group they
are talking in the terms of subsequent groups. What law
teacher has not heard about negligence and equity and
malice from a first year law student before the end of the
first week? The instructor finds that the whole orderliness
of his course is destroyed before he gets well started. These
classifications are by no means exclusive. Nor can it be ex-
pected that they should be kept distinct when it is re-
membered how piece-meal they grew up and have been de-
veloped.
But an observation not so readily made, is that each of
these larger classifications is itself made up of many smaller
fragments of theories. I think it possible to state in multi-
ple form the simplest cases which arise under any of the
classifications.
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Take this simple case:
P becomes enraged at some purely conventional remark of
D, and answers him sharply. D rejoins with a still sharper
reply. P resorts to epithets of an abusive nature. D
smacks P's face. P strikes back. D knocks P down and
severely hurts him. P sues D.
Without departing from the most orthodox terminology
the problem can be stated in several forms.
(1) Is D guilty of an assault and battery?
(2) Was P guilty of an assault upon D?
(3) Was D acting in self defense?
(4) Did P by provoking the combat thereby consent to
it?
(5) Did D in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense
use excessive force?
(6) Did P provoke the combat so that the damages are
to be mitigated? Which inquiry is most pertinent?
The number of doctrinal terms is not without significance:
Assault, battery, self-defense, privilege, excessive force,
mutual altercation, consent, provocation, mitigation. The
number of rules involved is also interesting:
(1) Ome who intentionally puts another in apprehension
of immediate harmful or offensive touching is guilty of an
assault.
(2) One who intentionally inflicts violence upon another,
or touches him offensively, is guilty of a battery.
(3) Mere words do not constitute an assault.
(4) One whose interest of personality is threatened by
the application of immediate violence is privileged to defend
himself.
(5) One who defends himself against unlawful violence
must not use excessive force.
(6) One who engages in a mutual altercation thereby
consents to the violence inflicted upon himself.
(7) Consent is not a defense to an unlawful act of
violence.
(8) Consent is a defense to an unlawful act of violence.
(9) One who under adequate provocation makes an as-
sault upon another is not excused but such provocation may
be considered in mitigation of the damages.
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These forms of statement, doctrinal terms, and rules by
no means exhaust the possibilities as the concluding analysis
will indicate.
If this simple case is to be submitted to a jury for deter.
mination, which of these rules and what forms of statement
shall the problem take? In other more complicated cases in
trespass, in deceit, in defamation, in negligence, the net-work
of theory increases in complexity with the multiplicity of
data.
What does this mean? The implications are numerous.
Let these suffice for the time: (1) Practitioners, as well as
judges, in dealing with a case will resolve it into the sort of
question or theory that best adapts itself to the conclusions
each may desire to reach. There are always two lawyers, at
least one trial judge, and may be a large number of appellate
judges. It is not at all unusual for the same case to be pre-
sented in multiple theories. (2) A multitude of arguments
and disagreements may arise in dealing with a case when it
is not a matter of right and wrong, but purely a matter of
taste and judgment as to the form of statement.
The waste of energy in attempting to harmonize holdings
of different courts when the trouble may lie in the selection
of an acceptable legal theory is very large. I do not believe
that it is generally appreciated what a large part this multi-
ple choice of theories plays in our courthouse government.
It must be remembered that the cases as reported by the ap-
pellate courts are refined products. They are the results of
a long process. They by no means indicate how the cases
looked to the lawyers and judges who tried them. Sometimes
a lawyer scarcely recognizes his case after it has gone through
the court of last resort. An opinion may, and frequently
does, merely represent an elaboration of the theory which
caught the fancy of the judge or court writing the opinion.
This fact makes it difficult to look through the well devel-
oped essay of the judge and catch even a glimpse of all the
competitive and conflicting theories and data from which the
choice of the appellate court was made. Another judge or
court might with equal assurance have reached an entirely
different conclusion and thus have written a very different.
opinion. This is nothing more than one of the risks incident
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to the judicial process. But it is highly important that it be
recognized that there is such a risk.
Probably the most extravagant net-work of theories em-
ployed in tort cases is found in the negligence group. The
most important of these cluster about the following: (1)
legal right, (2) legal duty, (3) negligence, (4) assumed
risk, (5) contributory negligence, (6) last clear chance, (7)
proximate cause, (8) wilful and gross negligence, (9) im-
puted negligence, (10) comparative negligence, (11) miti-
gation of damages, (12) aggravation of damages. Each of
these has subdivisions.
There are very few negligence cases, if any, which cannot
be stated in at least several of these theories. One lawyer
or one judge will insist that a problem to be decided is a ques-
tion of legal duty, another a question of assumed risk, still
another a question of contributory negligence, while the
appellate court may say it is one of proximate cause. Nor
is there the slightest reason to say one or the other is correct
except as it may fit into the basic assumption which a
person may give his inquiry, or as it may lend itself to the
judgment which the particular person desires. The possibili-
ties for this sort of thing can scarcely be exhausted.1a Con-
sider the possibilities for disagreement in the single theory
of "proximate cause"; legal cause and cause in fact; natural
cause and probable cause; intervening cause and concurrent
cause; ultimate cause and intermediate cause; direct cause
and remote cause; dominant cause and sole cause; and at
least that many more such phrases.
In all this riot of theory and terminology is it any wonder
that the courts are glutted with negligence cases? Is it re
markable that the reports are filed with dissertations which
are most bewildering in their doctrinal teachings? Is it a
cause for wonder that defendant's. lawyers should insist
Ia Compare two recent statements:
"The broad general principles of the law have a significant habit of travel-
ing in pairs of opposites * * *." John Dickinson, The Law Behind Law
II, 25 Col. L. Rev. 285, 298 (1929).
"Legal principles-and rules as well--are in the habit of hunting in
pairs * * *" W. W. Cook, 38 Yale L. J. 405, 406 (1920).
My only comment is that these principles and rules hunt in "packs" in-
stead of "pairs" and that it is seldom that there are as few as a "pair" in
a "pack".
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upon jury trial in order to get the benefit of the errors and
disagreements which fall out in such complexities?
A survey of this wilderness of methodology convinces me
that there is no possibility of finding a way through it all
unless certain basic assumptions are made. One of these
assumptions is the necessity for an adequate and under-
standable theory of analysis, which takes into account the
whole2 judicial process as it operates in tort cases. This re-
quires nothing short of an appreciation of the part played
in these cases by that "despised" subject which is called pro-
cedure. Law schools and law teachers have for a long time
been attempting to divorce procedure and so-called substan-
tive law. They have thought of law as the formal rules em-
ployed by judges rather than the whole process involving
the agencies which use such rules, and the uses they make of
them, as well as the net result translated in terms of dollar
and cent damages. They have ignored the administration
of the power we call law for the least significant part of
such administration. Any suggestion for dealing with negli-
gence and other tort cases should comprehend not only the
rules of law but the administration of those rules.
The suggestion which I make involves the use of an ana-
lytical formula. I choose this because it very largely avoids
reliance upon definitions and rules-those hopeless attempts
to freeze into a word, or multiple words, a meaning for all
times and places. Also, I choose a formula method because
it merely propounds but does not pretend to answer. It per-
mits the division of labor between judge and jury and leaves
the judgment of each as free as possible. It simplifies the
statement of the questions on which judgment is to be passed
and leaves the person who is expected to pass it as free to
survey all the factors which should influence his judgment.
This formula is not a departure, for it finds support in
countless decisions. It resolves a case into these problems:
2 This does not mean that the judicial process as a whole must be dealt
with by any analysis which may be formulated for use in tort cases. Plead-
ing and Evidence are parts of the process, but they need not be dealt with;
they can be isolated and yet. accounted for. But it is remarkable how
greatly the formula later set forth simplifies the pleading issue and thereby
gives direction to the evidence pertinent thereto.
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1. The right-duty problem.
2. The violation of duty problem.
3. The causal relation problem.
4. The damage problem.
Let it again be emphasized that the value of such a formula
is found chiefly in the flexibility it gives in allocating the
various phases of a case to judge and jury as is required un-
der our theory of government. In many cases the judge's
judgment alone is required; in others a concurrence of the
judgment of judge and jury is required on a single problem;
in still others, their concurrence is required on multiple
problems. These ideas are represented roughly by the terms
questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of
law and fact. Each of these, however, begs the question to
be determined, and it is difficult to find different terminology
that does not do the same thing. Sometimes the judge's
functions are spoken of as matters of policy and those of the
jury as fact finding. Even these are not sufficiently descrip-
tive. Policy is but a quick summing-up word. Questions
of fact are as narrow or as broad as it is desired to make
them. I should say the judge's primary or most important
functions are to pass upon the larger questions which go to
limit responsibility generally, and not merely in the particu-
lar case, such as the administrative difficulties involved in
such cases, the economic and moral exactions of the time
and place, and the development of rules which are designed
to prevent the recurrence of such hurts generally, as well as
to apportion the losses in the particular and similar cases.
These are the factors which are pertinent to the determina-
tion of "rights" and "duties." The latter are terms we use
to symbolize the conclusions of the judge in imposing or
denying responsibility after a summing up of all pertinent
factors. So the first problem suggested by the formula falls
to the judge and depends upon his judgment. It is subject
to further analysis as will appear later.
On the other hand, whether in the particular case the de-
fendant violated his duty, I would pass to the jury by some
formula which would indicate as unrestrictively as possible
upon what phase of the case the judgment of the jury should
be desired. In negligence cases for instance, the "foresee-
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ability of harm" formula is well designed for this purpose.
Although the formula is framed on the so-called negligence
issue,, nothing less than the jury's judgment on the whole
case should be desired or expected. As a matter of fact
legal theory makes no pretense to determine the factors
which should control the judgment of the jury beyond the
delivery of a ritualistic formula, plus in some states such
advisory cautions as the judge may think desirable to give.
But the fact of significance as to this problem is that the
jury's judgment is restricted to the single case, and it has no
validity beyond this.
These two problems go to the heart of a case. Here is de-
cided responsibility or no responsibility. The duty, and
violation of duty, problems require a concurrence of judg-
ment by judge and jury; the former from the standpoint of
legal science at large, the latter from the standpoint of the
details of the particular case. Incidentally, in all problems
which go to the jury, the judge must say if the proof makes
an issue to be submitted, and if so, he must translate that
problem to the jury, through an appropriate formula.
Of the two remaining problems, that of damages is of
great importance, while causal relation is of minor signifi-
cance. Both are easily isolated. The damage problem re-
quires the judge to determine the sufficiency of the evidence
to warrant a finding and what measurements shall be used,
but once the question is submitted it is for the jury to do
the measuring. Causal relation between defendant's conduct
and the hurt suffered is usually so clear as not to raise an
issue, but nevertheless it is habitually submitted. This in-
curable habit on the part of courts is not merely a futile
thing; it causes great difficulties. But when a question of
causal relation is properly in the case, it is for the judge to
determine whether the evidence makes an issue, and to sub-
mit the issue through some appropriate formula to the jury.
It is for the jury to make the finding. The courts frequently
submit what appears to be this problem under a so-called
"proximate cause" formula. A great deal of confusion is
developed by the latter practice. Under the analysis here
suggested there would be no place for it.
Through the formula as a whole I should hope to keep the
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functions of judge and jury separated as clearly as possible
and likewise indicate the scope their respective judgments
should take through the simple subordinate formulas em-
ployed for each problem. This is the process which as a
matter of fact has been developed by the courts but which
has been so frequently misunderstood or disregarded. Until
the scope of such process is understood, and something of its
practical workability is appreciated, the intricate problems
which are hidden under the terminology of "proximate
cause" and other such catchwords of the judges will not
yield to analysis. My suggestion therefore is that tort
cases can only be understood through the procedural pro-
cess to which they should be subjected by a court.
For the purposes of clarity I analyze the formula at
length:
1. Tie Right-Duty Problem.
a. Has plaintiff a right? Does government extend pro-
tection to plaintiff's interest? Is there any rule of law
designed to protect plaintiff's interest? Should plain-
tiff's interest be protected by law?
b. Did defendant owe plaintiff a duty with respect to the
interest which has been injured? Does, or should
government protect plaintiff',s interest against defend-
ant's conduct? What rule of law protects the plaintiff's
interest? Is plaintiff's interest protected against the
hazard which it has encountered? Is plaintiff's interest
protected by the rule of law he invokes against the risk
encountered? Who shall, or should, bear the risk of
plaintiff's hurt, plaintiff himself, or defendant?
b1. It should be noted further that the inquiry is subject
to great extension and variation, if the so-called defenses
are developed in the several types of cases: Shall plain-
tiff's own fault (consent, equal guilt, assumed risk,
contributory negligence) defeat his recovery? Or is de-
fendant deprived of such defense by his own excessive
conduct (undue advantage, last clear chance, discovered
peril, gross or wilful negligence?) Is defendant pro-
tected by a privilege? (These are numerous; self de-
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fense, defense of another, or of property, puffing, com-
petition, rival claimant, probable cause, certain confi-
dential relations, official position, truth, fair comment,
etc.) Or is defendant denied such privilege by reason
of excessive use? (excessive violence by way of de-
fense, malice, vicious motive, etc.) 3
c. How does a judge know the answer to such a question,
however it may be stated?
4
2. The Violation of Duty Problem.
a. Does the evidence make an issue that defendant has
violated his duty to the plaintiff?5
b. The translation by the judge to the jury of the issue,
if made by the evidence.'
c. The jury determines the issue whether defendant has
violated his duty.'
d. This entire process,' may be apposite to any defense
noted above.' In other words, a jury's judgment may
3 These-a, b and bi-are all different ways of stating the same problem.
There are others. Sometimes it presents a question more vididly to stato it
one way, sometimes another. One person may prefer one way, while another
may prefer a different one. One type of case may require one form of
statement, while another case requires a different form. The problem can
frequently be reduced to a narrower form than here indicated. In my
book, Rationale of Proximate Cause, in which numerous examples of this
problem are given, I doubtless employ one or two forms of statement ex-
cessively but I found uniformity of expression of great value in developing
the subject with the utmost brevity.
4 I have discussed but not answered this inquiry in my articles: "The
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases," 28 COL. L. REV. 1014 (1928); 29 COL.
L. REV. 255 (1920). See Sheldon -. The Wichita R. R. & L. Co., 125 Kans.
476, 264 Pac. 732 (1928). See CARDOZo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE
(1928).
5 How does the judge know when an issue is made? How does the em-
ployment of the "reasonable inference" formula help? See discussion in
Pleasant v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 22 L. ed. 780 (1874); Randall v. B3. & 0.
R. R. Co., 109 U. S. 478, 482, 27 L. ed. 1003 (1883); WIoMOOE ON EVIDENCE
(2nd ed.) §2494.
6 In negligence cases this is done through the "probability or foresecabil-
ity of harm" formula in some one of its many variations. I discuss this in
my article, "The Negligence Issue," 37 YALE L. J. 1029 (1928). How is the
issue submitted in other types of cases? The formula will be found to dif-
fer from type to type. There are numerous formulas available for this
function.
7 How does the jury find the answer? See discussion, 37 YALE L. J. 1029.
8 2. a, b, c.
9 1. bi.
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be desirable on a defensive issue as well as an affirma-
tive one. As an illustration: If the judge decides that
contributory negligence should be let in as a defense,
then under orthodox practice if (a) there is evidence to
raise the issue, (b) it must be translated to the jury,
(c) for their finding.
3. The Causal Relation Problem.
a. Does the evidence make an issue that defendant's con-
duct caused plaintiff's hurt?"
b. The translation of the issue by the judge to the
jury?1"
c. The jury determines the issue, whether defendant's
conduct was a "substantial" cause factor. 2
4. The Damage Problem.1"
a. Does the evidence make an issue as to the extent and
value of the hurt plaintiff has received to an interest as
to which he may recover? 4
10 This problem seldom arises as the evidence is usually clear one way or
the other. But how is the judge to know when an issue is made? The
same "reasonable inference" formula should be used here as in the negligence
issue. See supra, n. 5.
11 This issue should be submitted by some variation of the "substantial
factor" formula. See my article, "Are There Dependable Rules of Causa-
tion," 77 PENN. L. REv. 601 (1929); my book RA.TIONALE OF PoxIMTF
CAUsE (1929) pp. 132-141.
12 How does the jury find the answer to this question? See discussion,
PENN. L. Rav., supra, n. 11.
13 Neither casebook nor text has apparently been able to distinguish the
damage problem from the other problems of responsibility. They give prac-
tically all their attention to the three problems of fixing responsibility
(problems 1, 2 and 3) as opposed to the measuring of responsibility in terms
of money (problem 4). No attempt will be made to deal with the problem
here. I set it aside with the suggestion that the discussion of direct, con-
scquential and remote damages have nothing whatsoever to do with the prob-
lem. Such discussions are attempts to deal with the right-duty problem in
language ill adapted to such a use. A good example of this use of such
terms is found in Farley v. Crystal Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 9 A. L. R. 933
(1920). It is clear that there were more important factors directing the
judgment of the court in that case than the abstruse distinction between
direct and- consequential.
14 How does the judge determine this? See supra, n. 5.
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b. The translation by the judge to the jury of the issue,
with appropriate instructions as to the standards and
measurements to be used. 5
c. The jury determines the extent of hurt or loss and
evaluates it in terms of dollars and cents? 8
This analysis should not be misunderstood. It has no
power of its own. It is merely a device for bringing to the
surface the significant problems of a case so that judgment
can be the better passed upon them. It permits the difficul-
ties to be located and isolated rather neatly. But it does not
control judgment.. It also permits the functions of those
who have a part in passing judgment to be easily allocated
to them and kept as distinct as possible. In doing
these things it necessarily must afford the means for
articulating the process as well as its result. But it is
not the only way to handle tort cases-if it is merely a good
way, that is enough. Doubtless something much better will
Te developed.
15 The standards and measurements which may be employed in a particu-
lar case may be numerous. The one or more which a court will use depends
upon the ones made available by the pleadings and evidence in the case.
Ordinarily the court will direct the jury to employ the one which seems
most appropriate to the particular issue. Sometimes the one employed is
not as good as one which might have been used had it been made available
by the pleadings and proof. The most significant thing which can be said
here is that there is no one measure which rmst always be used in cases
which seem to be of the same type. Courts are not so lacking in resource-
fulness as that, though there are many discussions in opinions and in texts
which would indicate that there are standardized measures of damages for
each situation, and that there is some way to find out the one which must
be used. Such statements are misleading.
16 How does the jury arrive at the amount? They employ their judgment
on this problem as they do on all other problems submitted to them. Their
judgment is final so long as they act within the boundaries provided for
their conduct, and so long as the court thinks the result not so unreasonable
as to require modification or setting aside.
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